Attorney Hüseyin Aydın · Alanya / Antalya
One evening the signal bars on your phone disappear and the corner of the screen reads “Emergency calls only”. You assume it is a network fault and wait until morning. Yet at that very moment someone else has inserted a new SIM card for your number into another phone, is receiving your bank’s confirmation codes one by one and is emptying your account.
Short answer: In this method, known in practice as a SIM card change, “line cloning” or “SIM swap”, the bank usually argues that “the transactions were approved with the code sent to your number”. However, under the settled case law of the Turkish Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) and banking regulations, a one-time password sent by SMS does not prove that the customer carried out the transaction. Where the line was changed with forged documents, the bank is, as a rule, liable to the customer; the mobile operator that issued a SIM card on a fake ID may be held liable both towards the customer and in the bank’s recourse action.
Important: Under Article 34(8) of the Regulation on Banks’ Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services, a bank must determine whether the SIM card on the line has been changed before sending an SMS confirmation code. Unless the change is confirmed, the SIM-based factor cannot be used for authentication for 90 days; for transactions carried out without two-factor authentication during confirmation, the burden of proving that the customer made the transaction lies with the bank.
This type of fraud, frequently encountered throughout Turkey including Alanya, Antalya, Gazipaşa, Manavgat, Mahmutlar and Konaklı, is examined in this guide in light of the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, the Bank Cards and Credit Cards Law No. 5464, the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809, the BDDK (banking regulator) regulation and Court of Cassation decisions. One of the decisions concerns a case that came from the Antalya 1st Consumer Court.
Table of Contents
- How Does SIM Swap Fraud Work?
- The First Sign: Your Line Suddenly Goes Dead
- The Bank’s Liability and the 90-Day Rule
- Court of Cassation and Regional Court Decisions
- Liability of the Mobile Operator
- Whom Should the Victim Sue?
- When Does the Customer’s Fault Come into Play?
- What to Do When Your Line Is Cut
- Preventive Measures
- Frequently Asked Questions
1. How Does SIM Swap Fraud Work?
In cases that have reached the courts, the method is largely the same:
- Obtaining personal data: The fraudsters first obtain identity details, the phone number and sometimes the internet banking password.
- New SIM card with a fake ID: Using a forged ID or a copy of the ID in the line holder’s name, they apply to a dealer or subscriber centre and obtain a new SIM card for the same number.
- The real owner’s line is disabled: As soon as the new SIM card is activated, the line on the real owner’s phone stops working.
- Confirmation codes go to the fraudster: One-time passwords sent by the bank now reach the phone in the fraudster’s hands.
- The account is emptied: Internet or mobile banking is accessed; if necessary, the bank’s call centre is called to lift the SIM card block, cash advances are drawn on the credit card, loans are taken out and the money is quickly transferred to other accounts.
In one case before the courts, it was established that 24 separate transactions were carried out via a SIM card obtained with a fake ID from the evening of 16 December until the following morning; a cash advance of TRY 10,000 was drawn on the credit card, a loan of about TRY 58,000 was credited to the account and a total of about TRY 68,000 was transferred to third parties. In the same file, the bank lifted the SIM card block that evening and the first transaction was made three minutes later (Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal, 12th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/920, K. 2026/207, 05.02.2026).
2. The First Sign: Your Line Suddenly Goes Dead
The most obvious sign of this fraud is that the phone suddenly drops off the network and the “No service” or “Emergency calls only” warning persists for a long time. Most people think it is a network fault. Yet this is exactly the time the fraudsters need.
The İzmir Regional Court of Appeal held that a customer experiencing problems with his line could be excused for not immediately connecting this with banking transactions, and that because the transactions were made at short intervals, informing the bank later did not affect the outcome; it attributed no fault to the customer, and the Court of Cassation upheld the decision (Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/343, K. 2024/4029, 16.05.2024). Even so, acting as quickly as possible is important to prevent the loss from growing.
3. The Bank’s Liability and the 90-Day Rule
The bank is an institution of trust
According to the settled view of the Court of Cassation, banks are institutions of trust; they are obliged to protect the deposits entrusted to them and are liable even for slight negligence. Since under Article 570 of the Code of Obligations the risk in an irregular deposit passes to the depositary, money withdrawn through an unauthorised transaction is, as a rule, the bank’s loss and the depositor’s claim continues. The burden of proving that the customer lost his passwords through his own fault also lies with the bank.
BDDK Regulation: 90 days after a SIM card change
The Regulation on Banks’ Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services imposes a clear obligation on banks against SIM swap fraud. Article 34(8) of the Regulation reads as follows:
“The bank shall identify customers who have changed their SIM card or changed their electronic communications operator through number porting, before sending an SMS OTP, by ensuring the necessary integration with mobile communications operators established in Turkey, and for such customers, unless the changes are confirmed, the SIM-based factor may not be used as an authentication factor in providing electronic banking services for 90 days from the date of the change. For any transaction carried out without two-factor authentication while the changes are being confirmed, the burden of proving that the transactions were carried out by the customer lies with the bank.”
Regulation Art. 34(8) (as quoted in Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2024/229, K. 2024/5935; unofficial translation)
In practice, this provision means:
- Before sending an SMS confirmation code, the bank must check whether the SIM card on the customer’s line has been changed.
- If there has been a change that has not been confirmed, the SMS code cannot be used as an authentication factor for 90 days.
- For transactions carried out without two-factor authentication during confirmation, the burden of proving that the customer made the transaction lies with the bank.
In practice, even though banks block internet banking after a SIM change, it is common for the fraudster to call the call centre and have this block lifted. Therefore, for transfers, cash advances or loans made immediately after a SIM card change, the verification used to lift the block and the call centre recordings must always be examined.
4. Court of Cassation and Regional Court Decisions
| Decision | Facts | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Yargıtay 3rd Civil Chamber, E. 2024/3854, K. 2025/3493, 23.06.2025 | The customer’s line was cloned while he was held in prison; cash advances were drawn and purchases made with his credit cards. | It was accepted that the bank did not prevent transactions via internet banking and a change of the card delivery address without confirmation from the customer after the SIM change; the decision that the customer did not owe about TRY 23,000 was upheld. |
| Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/343, K. 2024/4029, 16.05.2024 | The line was changed, the fraudster called the bank’s call centre to lift the block on the account and transactions of about TRY 120,000 were made. | It was found that the officer did not become suspicious despite the fraudster’s wrong answers; the bank was held liable, no fault was attributed to the customer and the decision was upheld. |
| Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2024/229, K. 2024/5935, 03.09.2024 | An EFT was made without the customer’s knowledge from an IP address different from the customer’s internet line. | The bank was found at fault for not detecting the different line or device and warning the customer, and for breaching the SIM change procedure (Regulation Art. 34(8)); the decision was upheld. |
| Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal, 12th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/920, K. 2026/207, 05.02.2026 | A SIM card was obtained with a fake ID and money was withdrawn in one night through 24 transactions after loans and cash advances were credited to the account. | The decision that the customer did not owe the bank was upheld on the grounds that the bank did not operate mechanisms and additional security protocols to ensure access by the right user and did not detect suspicious transactions. This is an appellate decision; the route to the Court of Cassation was left open. |
| Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/6174, K. 2024/7619, 04.11.2024 | The line was cloned, the bank lifted the SIM card block without identity verification and transactions of about TRY 291,000 were made. | The decision holding the bank liable for not contacting the customer during consecutive suspicious transactions was upheld; it was stated that the operator’s fault could be discussed in a separate action brought by the bank against the operator. |
| Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2020/3364, K. 2021/49, 18.01.2021 (Antalya) | In a case heard by the Antalya 1st Consumer Court, the customer sued both the bank and the mobile operator. | The operator’s appeal was dismissed and its liability became final. The Court of Cassation, however, reversed the decision as regards the bank, stating that according to the evidence the bank had taken all measures relating to internet banking. |
The facts in the 3rd Civil Chamber’s decision are particularly striking: since the customer was in prison when the transactions were made, it was clearly impossible for him to have made them himself. The court found that after the SIM change the bank allowed transactions and a change of the credit card delivery address without confirmation from the customer, and stressed that the bank is liable even for slight negligence.
The 2021 decision from Antalya, on the other hand, shows that the bank’s liability is not automatic: if the bank can prove with evidence the security measures it took, it may escape liability. That is why obtaining the bank’s log records, call centre recordings and records of the SIM change check in full is decisive in these cases.
5. Liability of the Mobile Operator
The act that opens the door to the fraud is the issuing of a new SIM card on forged documents. Article 56 of the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 imposes a clear obligation on operators in this respect:
“No subscription may be established, no subscription transaction may be carried out and no registration of devices bearing electronic identity information may be made or caused to be made by the operator or its representative without the person’s knowledge and consent; no false documents may be drawn up for this purpose, no documents may be altered and such documents may not be used.”
Electronic Communications Law No. 5809, Art. 56(4) (unofficial translation)
In a recourse action brought by a bank against an operator, the 11th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation reversed a regional court decision finding the operator not liable, relying on the following findings in the expert report (Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2017/5251, K. 2019/4658, 20.06.2019):
- Had the subscriber centre authorised by the operator not given a new SIM card to an unauthorised person presenting a copy of the real subscriber’s ID, the confirmation codes would not have fallen into the fraudsters’ hands.
- The subscriber centre is the operator’s auxiliary person; there is a causal link between its identity check and the loss.
- It is also the operator that approved and immediately activated the SIM card change.
- The operator knows that lines are easily changed with fake IDs to obtain confirmation codes; its duty is to deliver the message to the real subscriber, not to an unauthorised person.
In a more recent recourse action, the Court of Cassation reversed a decision that apportioned fault equally and held that the operator should be found 75 percent at fault:
“…the fraudulent transactions in question were completed by using the one-time password sent by message to the SIM card, and the defendant GSM company, which did not carry out the necessary and sufficient examination as to whether the SIM card change was made by the real line holder, bears greater fault in the occurrence of the loss…”
Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2020/5620, K. 2022/2858, 06.04.2022 (unofficial translation)
The degree of fault is determined in each case through expert examination; 75 percent is not a fixed rule for every case. However, these decisions show that an operator that issues a SIM card on forged documents cannot easily escape liability.
6. Whom Should the Victim Sue?
| Relationship | Legal position |
|---|---|
| Customer → Bank | The main counterparty is the bank. The duty to protect deposits, liability for slight negligence and the burden of proof lie with the bank. For individual customers, the dispute is a consumer dispute. |
| Customer → Operator | Possible, but the outcome depends on the facts. In the 2021 case from Antalya, the operator was held liable to the customer (E. 2020/3364, K. 2021/49). In other cases, however, the claim against the operator was dismissed (Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber, E. 2013/747, K. 2013/18076, 10.10.2013; Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal, 12th Civil Chamber, E. 2023/920, K. 2026/207). |
| Bank → Operator | A bank that has paid its customer may seek recourse from the operator that issued the SIM card on forged documents in proportion to its fault (E. 2017/5251, K. 2019/4658; E. 2020/5620, K. 2022/2858). |
For the victim, therefore, the safest route is, as a rule, to pursue the claim against the bank; if the dealer’s negligence in the identity check can be documented, joining the operator to the action may also be considered. The apportionment of fault between the bank and the operator is a matter for them to resolve between themselves later.
7. When Does the Customer’s Fault Come into Play?
In these cases banks usually argue that the customer failed to protect his personal data or did not notice and promptly report the problem with his line. However, the burden of proving the customer’s fault lies with the bank. The mere fact that identity details somehow fell into fraudsters’ hands does not in itself make the customer at fault.
On the other hand, if the customer himself read out or forwarded the confirmation code to someone posing as a bank officer, the outcome may turn against the customer. It is therefore very important that the events are described accurately and completely in the first report, in the objection to the bank and in the statement to the prosecutor. For more details, see our guide Unauthorised Withdrawals from Your Account in Turkey and the Bank’s Liability.
8. What to Do When Your Line Is Cut
- Call your banks and your operator immediately. From another phone, contact the call centres of all banks where you have accounts and have internet and mobile banking and your cards temporarily blocked; ask your operator whether a SIM card change has been made on your line and, if so, have the line blocked at once. Note the times of the calls and the reference numbers.
- Preserve the evidence. Keep a record of the time the line was cut, screenshots, email notifications and bank statements.
- Object to the bank in writing. List each transaction with date, time and amount and state in writing that the transactions were not yours. For credit card transactions, do not miss the 10-day objection period under Article 11 of Law No. 5464.
- File a criminal complaint. Apply to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and ask for an investigation of the dealer and the document with which the SIM card was changed, and of the dealer’s camera footage.
- Request the records. Ask the bank in writing for its transaction records (logs, IP addresses, call centre recordings, SIM change check) and the operator for the application documents for the SIM card change, and ask that they be preserved.
- Choose the right forum. For individual customers, depending on the monetary threshold, the Consumer Arbitration Committee or mandatory mediation followed by the consumer court is the route.
9. Preventive Measures
- Regularly check the lines registered in your name via e-Devlet; report any line you do not recognise to the operator.
- Keep the mobile approval and notification options offered by your bank switched on; set up extra notifications for large transactions.
- Do not hand out copies of your ID unnecessarily; write the purpose on any copies you provide.
- Never read out any code over the phone to someone claiming to be from a bank, an operator or a public authority.
- If your phone stays off the network for a long time, do not dismiss it as a simple fault.
Conclusion
In SIM swap fraud, the code that should reach your phone ends up in someone else’s pocket. That is why the defence that “the transaction was made with the code sent to your number” does not on its own release the bank from liability. Banks are obliged to check for SIM card changes, stop suspicious transactions and prove that the customer made the transaction. The fault of an operator that issues a SIM card on a fake ID may give rise both to liability towards the customer and to the bank’s right of recourse. Nevertheless, a bank that can prove the measures it took with concrete evidence may escape liability; the outcome is determined in each case by the records and the expert examination.
For victims, the most important step is to act quickly as soon as the line is cut, preserve the evidence and not miss any deadlines. With regard to your specific disputes and to avoid any loss of rights, it is advisable to seek professional legal advice from a lawyer specialised in the field.
Frequently Asked Questions
The transactions were approved with the code sent to my number. Is the bank released from liability?
As a rule, no. If the line was changed with forged documents, the code reached the fraudster, not you. In addition, under Regulation Art. 34(8) the bank must detect a SIM card change before sending an SMS code; for transactions carried out without two-factor authentication, the burden of proof lies with the bank.
What is the 90-day rule after a SIM card change?
The bank identifies customers whose SIM card has changed or who have ported their number before sending an SMS, and unless the change is confirmed it cannot use the SIM-based factor for authentication for 90 days.
I noticed late that my line had been cut. Does that count as my fault?
Not necessarily on its own. In a decision upheld by the Court of Cassation, a customer who could not immediately connect a problem with his line to banking transactions was excused. The specific facts of the case are decisive.
Can I also sue the mobile operator?
Yes. In one case from Antalya the operator was held liable to the customer, while in other cases the claim against the operator was dismissed. As a rule, a claim against the bank is the stronger route; after paying, the bank may seek recourse from the operator.
Is the bank liable in every case?
No. If the bank proves with the evidence in the file that it took all necessary measures relating to internet banking, it may escape liability. If the customer himself gave the confirmation code to third parties, the outcome may also turn against the customer.
My line was suddenly cut. What should I do first?
From another phone, call your banks and your operator and have the channels blocked, ask whether a SIM change was made, note the times of the calls, object to the bank in writing and file a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Sources: Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Art. 570; Bank Cards and Credit Cards Law No. 5464, Art. 11; Electronic Communications Law No. 5809, Art. 56; Regulation on Banks’ Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services, Art. 34(8); Yargıtay 3rd Civil Chamber E. 2024/3854 K. 2025/3493; Yargıtay 11th Civil Chamber E. 2024/229 K. 2024/5935; E. 2023/343 K. 2024/4029; E. 2023/6174 K. 2024/7619; E. 2020/5620 K. 2022/2858; E. 2020/3364 K. 2021/49; E. 2017/5251 K. 2019/4658; E. 2013/747 K. 2013/18076; Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal 12th Civil Chamber E. 2023/920 K. 2026/207. Legislation texts: mevzuat.gov.tr.
Legal Notice: This text has been prepared for general information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. sophoshukuk.com makes no referral, guarantee or promise of outcome. Each case must be assessed on its own particular circumstances; for your specific dispute, please obtain professional advice from a lawyer.